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Pro-Poor Irrigation
Management Transfer?
A growing body of international findings shows that
irrigation management transfer can actually contribute to
rural poverty by aggravating existing inequities within
irrigation schemes or introducing new ones.
New research looks at how the transfer of irrigation
management from governments to farmers can be done in
a way that benefits poor farmers.
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Benefit Poor Farmers Rather than Hurting Them?
Driven largely by financial pressures, many governments are transferring full or partial management responsibility for
irrigation systems from government agencies to farmers organized into Water User Associations (WUAs). In most cases,
improving the situation of poor farmers has been a secondary aim of this reform. But there is increasing evidence that
Irrigation Management Transfer (IMT) can actually negatively impact the situation of poor farmers—and, in extreme cases,
can even cause the collapse of irrigation schemes.
New research assessed two different IMT programs: The Gujarat Participatory Irrigation Management (PIM) program,
one of the first IMT programs in India, and the Andhra Pradesh Farmers’ Management of Irrigation Systems (APFMIS)
program, which with its sweeping reforms has served as an example worldwide. This research suggests that even if the
IMT process contains all the right ingredients on paper—such as strong voting rights for farmers, irrespective of farm
size—poor farmers are less informed on the whole about their rights and so tend to lose out on many of the potential
benefits of IMT. The study showed that in both Gujarat and Andhra Pradesh poor farmers tended to participate more in
the repair and rehabilitation work, while the larger farmers were more involved in the decision-making process—
dominating the meetings and committees (see fig.1).
To make IMT more pro-poor, and to ensure the viability of WUAs, which depend heavily on the labor contribution of small
farmers, policy makers should take steps to ensure that poor farmers participate equally in decision-making processes.
These steps include raising awareness and access to information, and making the election of WUA committees (which favor
the village elite) more competitive and transparent. Monitoring participation in WUA activities and decision making against a
reliable, and easily available indicator of poverty—farm size—is a key in evaluating equity trends over time.
IMT involves the handover of a number of
responsibilities of the Irrigation Department to WUAs.
Depending on the program, these can include
distributing water, setting charge rates and collecting
fees, and implementing the repair and rehabilitation
(R&R) of canals.
Community management and greater autonomy,
in theory, result in greater equity and improvements
in the lives of the poor. Yet, in practice, researchers
who studied two different IMT programs (APFMIS
and PIM, Box 1) operating in large-scale canal-
irrigation schemes found that this was not always
true. The study, conducted by the International Water
Management Institute (IWMI) and the Gujarat
Institute of Development Research (GIDR) with
support from the Ford Foundation and the Swedish
International Development Agency (SIDA), surveyed
700 landowning and tenant farmers from seven
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Figure 1. Proportion of households  participating
in WUA activities, by farm size
%
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1 January, 2003WUAs in the two states (plus 67 WUA committee
members). The findings suggest that inequities
resulting from IMT are primarily due to differences in
access to information between poor and wealthy
farmers. Wealthy farmers tend to be better informed
of their rights and responsibilities as WUA
members and participate more in decision-making
processes.
Although farmers run the WUA,
participation levels are not high
Participation in WUAs is low in both programs.
After 2 years, half of the supposed constituencies of the
WUAs were not aware of their existence. In Gujarat,
after five years of IMT, still a quarter didn’t know about
the WUAs. Of the WUAs surveyed, awareness was
highest (93%) in the one where an NGO had strongly
intervened.
Poor and nonpoor farmers are not
equally well informed about WUAs
Being informed is definitely related to larger farm
size. In both states, the number of small-scale farmers
who were unaware of the existence of their WUAs was
twice that of the large-scale farmers (see fig. 2)
Characteristics Andhra Pradesh Gujarat
Legal basis of IMT program Andhra Pradesh Farmers’ Management of Participatory Irrigation Management
Irrigation Systems (APFMIS) (PIM) Resolution
Year implemented 1999 1995
Scale State-wide: all irrigation schemes 13 pilot WUAs
(12,000 WUAs)
Tiers All tiers: primary, secondary and tertiary Scattered tertiary blocks
Implementer Irrigation Department and District Irrigation Department or NGO
Administration
WUA’s responsibilities R&Ra  (huge funds channeled directly to WUA); R&R; collection of demand forms; fee
some water distribution. In future: setting, setting, water allocation and distributionb
collection and partial management of fees (just beginning); fee collection
(and payment to government)
Government’s Fee setting and collection; some water Major rehabilitation works
responsibilities distribution; major rehabilitation works
Owner of canals Government Government
Impacts
Improved access to water 15% of farmers surveyed 15% of farmers surveyed
Expansion of irrigated area 2% of farmers surveyed (average 0.66 ha) 3% of farmers surveyed (average 1.1 ha)
Box 1. Two IMT programs: Characteristics and early impacts
aRepair and rehabilitation.
bThis only applies to the water that the Irrigation Department delivers to the intake.
Positive impacts were seen in Andhra Pradesh after only two years, and in Gujarat after five.
Impacts were more wide-ranging in Andhra Pradesh, both geographically and at higher levels: the IMT program was designed (under APFMIS) to eventually
include Distributary Committees (the next level up from WUAs) and Project Committees (at the main system level). But in Gujarat, the scattered WUAs
could not come together to have an impact at higher levels. This means that “head-tail” inequities cannot be addressed there.
Figure 2. Proportion of households unaware of the
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Water Policy Briefing 2Poor and nonpoor farmers do not
participate equally in all activities
The relative absence of small-scale farmers from
committees and general meetings means that they risk
not gaining the crucial benefits that can be realized,
from IMT. They are excluded from information,
decision making and negotiation with leaders
regarding the spending of government grants, site
selection for R&R, future self-management of water
distribution, and fee collection. In reality, what is called
a “WUA” is first and foremost a handful of local elite
who facilitate the implementation of state-initiated and
-funded R&R work in a manner beneficial to
themselves.
Farm size: A reliable indicator of poverty
Because the poverty dimensions of large-scale canal
irrigation systems are difficult to measure, they are
rarely studied. So, not surprisingly, inequities have
rarely been quantified. That is, until IWMI and GIDR
researchers looked at the way farm size (which is
conveniently recorded in land registers) was associated
with a number of poverty-related factors.
They found that farm size is a good proxy for
income and poverty.  This means it is relatively easy for
government staff, WUAs, NGOs or researchers to
routinely monitor equity trends in IMT. This means
that any inequities within schemes can be detected
early and corrected, before they become entrenched. It
also means that if localized projects aimed at the poor
are planned (such as rehabilitation, drainage and
salinization management), then areas with high
concentrations of poor farmers can be targeted.
Box 2. Making IMT more pro-poor
Clearly define the rights of farmers. APFMIS serves as a
good model for this. By law, farmers have equal decision-
making power within the WUA, regardless of farm size (i.e.,
one farm, one vote).
Raise awareness, especially among poor farmers.
In forthcoming publicity campaigns, state policy makers
and the civil service should ensure that farmers understand
the IMT process and their rights and responsibilities.
Reform the election process within WUAs. This is the single
most effective way to substantially improve small-scale
farmers’ inclusion in the WUAs. Election of new presidents
and committee members should be vote-based rather than
consensus-based, to promote competition between several
candidates. Ensuring this, and also that farmers are well-
informed, will increase transparency and equity.
Differentiate between those farmers in the command
area who use canal water and those who use alternative
sources of irrigation in defining rights. A high proportion
of farmers do not use canal irrigation at all (or may use it
only in some years)—relying instead on alternative water
sources. The management of canal irrigation does affect the
availability of alternative water sources, such as
groundwater and hence the farmers who depend on them,
but obviously not to the same degree as farmers who
depend solely on canal water.
Monitor, by farm size, participation in the WUA (in
elections, decision-making processes, fee collection, etc.).
Research showed farm size to be a reliable indicator of pov-
erty for intra-scheme comparison. And, the data are gener-
ally readily available, so that monitoring costs are minimal.
Monitoring over time provides a good indication of equity
trends and is a prerequisite for ensuring pro-poor IMT.
The researchers classified “small farmers” as those
operating landholdings of less than one hectare
(whether tenants or landowners). “Larger farmers”
were those who farmed one hectare or more. There
were three main findings relating to farm size.
1. Plot location: Head v. tail
In both states,  significantly greater proportions of
small farmers’ plots are located in the less-desirable tail
ends (fig. 1). This seems to be both a consequence of
poverty (poor farmers lack political clout and are
therefore often forced to accept plots in the tail ends)
and a cause (farmers in the tail ends often experience
The relative absence of small-scale
farmers from committees and general
meetings means that they risk not gaining
the crucial benefits that can be realized,
from IMT.
3 January, 2003Figure 3. Proportion of plots at head and tail ends
of irrigation schemes
more difficulty in receiving enough water and are
therefore more limited in the choice of crops and their
ability to improve their yields, and are harder hit by
droughts). In the WUAs in both states, IMT that leads
to better provision of canal water to the tails would be
“pro-poor” in itself.
2. Crop choice: High value v. low value
In Andhra Pradesh, the proportion of small farmers’
plots (54%) planted with subsistence food crops (such
as rice) was greater than that of larger farmers (32%).
The opposite is true for cash crops that fetch a high
price at the market: 18% of larger farmers’ plots were
planted with chili, compared with only 8% of small
farmers’ plots. This again reinforces the value of farm
size as an indicator of income and poverty.
3. Significance of other income sources
Farm size and income diversification are actually
inversely related. This is especially true of very small
farms, where there is often more than one source of
income. In areas with off-farm employment
opportunities (Gujarat, for example), the smallest
farms are not necessarily the most income-poor. This
means, of course, that farm size is not such a useful
indicator of poverty in these cases. In cases like this,
the importance of other income sources needs to be
investigated. This would require researchers to collect
additional information with respect to poverty (e.g.,
cattle ownership, earnings from wage-employment,
number of male and female household members who
are earning, etc.).
Access to alternative water sources
In Andhra Pradesh, researchers found that canal
irrigation tends to be a “poor man’s affair.” Here, and in
many areas, poor farmers rely more on canal water
than wealthier farmers. Poor farmers have less access
to alternative irrigation sources (such as groundwater),
which are generally more reliable. Only 46% of small
farmers’ plots were irrigated from alternative water
sources, compared with 56% of larger farmers’ plots.
One reason for this is that there are fewer pumps
and wells in the tail ends (where the majority of small
farmers’ plots lie). This is reflected in the fact that only
32% of tail-end plots (irrespective of farm size)
benefited from alternative irrigation sources,
compared with 64% of head end plots.
Another factor is that small farmers lack the capital
to invest in pumps and wells. When canal supplies are
insufficient or unreliable, these farmers are forced to
Significantly more small farmers than
larger farmers were completely unaware
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There are inequities in location: Small farms are more often located in
the tail ends than larger farms, and so face greater insecurities in terms
of water supply.
Water Policy Briefing 4buy water from alternative sources and tend to pay
higher prices for that water. It is hardly surprising, then,
that most crops grown by small farmers using
alternative irrigation sources, receive fewer number of
waterings than the crops of larger farmers. So, even
though the net benefits of alternative irrigation would
be higher, small farmers tend to rely on canal water
because it is cheap.
The important implication this has for IMT is that
small farmers would benefit more than larger farmers
from improved canal-irrigation performance. In
Andhra Pradesh, therefore, any improvement in
access to canal water in general would be “pro-poor”
in itself, and could count on the active support of
small farmers. As a corollary, modes of IMT that
negatively affect the provision of canal water would
hit the poor particularly hard.
In Gujarat, the situation is different. Researchers
found no differences between small and larger farmers
in the use of canal water, or in access to alternative
sources and the number of waterings received. But, of
course, the irrigation costs from alternative sources
may be higher for small farmers.
Although small farmers are concentrated in the tail
ends in Gujarat, they take equal advantage of the
alternative irrigation sources. This is because, in
contrast to the situation in Andhra Pradesh, these
sources are more widespread in the tail than they are in
the other reaches. In fact, in the tails, 69% of all plots
were irrigated with alternative sources, compared with
59% in the head and middle reaches. So, the common
assumption that access to water in canal irrigation
commands is farm-size-neutral appears to be valid in
the Gujarati WUAs. Improvements to the canal
irrigation system, as long as it did not negatively
impact groundwater availability, would benefit poor
and nonpoor equally.
Participation in WUA activities
In all WUAs, higher levels of participation in R&R
work were found among small farmers than among
larger farmers. However, small farmers participate
considerably less in meetings than do larger farmers,
and they rarely become committee members. For
example, in Andhra Pradesh, although 19% of small
farmers took part in R&R work only 9% attended
meetings. The corresponding participation rates in
R&R and in meetings for larger farmers were 9% and
24%, respectively.
In all WUAs, higher levels of participation
in R&R work were found among small
farmers than among larger farmers.
However, small farmers participate
considerably less in meetings than do
larger farmers, and they rarely become
committee members.
So, small farmers make an essential contribution to
the IMT program through their upkeep of the canals.
This is probably also because they are more dependent
on supplies of canal water and upon agriculture as
their primary source of income. But how long will they
continue to do this (especially if the current subsidies
are reduced) if they are deprived of having their say in
meetings and in the running of the WUA? Greater
participation of small farmers in decision making will
make IMT more pro-poor, and will increase its
sustainability and even its viability.
Having an input into the committee’s allocation of
water would give small farmers the chance to make the
benefits of IMT more equitable. For example, during
droughts, allocating water to each farmer, rather than
according to farm size, would reduce the inequities that
already exist due to poorer farmers having smaller
landholdings. When faced with a serious water
shortage, one Gujarati WUA allocated enough water to
irrigate one hectare to each farmer, and then shared the
remaining amount according to farm size. This
resulted in high levels of farmer satisfaction, with more
than 40% of farmers interviewed reporting that IMT
had improved their access to water.
Greater participation in meetings would also ensure
that the benefits of R&R work are felt equally by all
members, and not just by the local elite. For example, in
one WUA, the cementing of earthen canals was carried
out only in the lands owned by the WUA’s president and
committee members. There have also been cases
reported of some presidents and committees (or their
families and friends) replacing the official contractors
5 January, 2003Better inclusion of the poor in
information and decision-making flows
would result in more sustainable
advances in poverty alleviation.
appointed by the Irrigation Department when large
R&R subsidies were at stake.
So how can the election of committees be made
fairer? The APFMIS Act already provides all the
elements necessary for a pro-poor mode of IMT. The
WUA members have well-defined rights to elect leaders
and hold them accountable. Added to this, small
farmers have strong formal voting rights, because these
rights are independent of farm size. Finally, the election
procedures are well designed and defined. Yet, in reality,
it is the wealthier candidates (with money to spend on
campaigns) who tend to get elected.
In the PIM IMT program in Gujarat, genuine
elections are rarely held. Implementing agencies have
targeted wealthier castes when giving out information,
so committee members usually come from this group. A
democratic voting system would improve this situation.
But in both states, raising awareness is critical.
Large publicity campaigns that inform farmers about
the WUA and their rights and responsibilities, as well
as about the elections themselves, will benefit those
who are least aware of WUAs, and who are least active
in decision making—poor farmers.
Impact and future of the two IMT
programs
IMT in Andhra Pradesh and Gujarat lead to,
respectively: improved access to water for 15% and 25%
of the farmers surveyed and extension of the irrigated
area for 2% (average 0.66ha) and 3% (average 1.1 ha).
These early gains were independent of farm size.
(However, the qualitative scheme-level information
highlighted that WUA leaders imposed their personal
choice with regard to the priority of sites for R&R.)
These achievements
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overdue repairs and maintenance are “easy gains.” There
is a risk that the pace of improvements may slow down.
What is more, it is uncertain whether the heavy
subsidies provided for R&R will continue indefinitely, or
what the contribution of farmers’ labor or cash will be.
In Gujarat, WUAs are in the process of undertaking
water allocation, distribution and fee collection—
cumbersome tasks the government is pleased to hand
over. But, the new obligations to collect demand forms
and fees represent a serious extra burden for irrigation
committee members. Whether WUAs are willing, and
equipped, to carry out the revenue functions is a
question that has yet to be answered.
Under APFMIS, implementing the first steps at the
lowest tiers has created a massive momentum. This
forms a sound basis for the planned next steps: the
organization of farmers at higher tiers and a complete
handover. But a program (such as PIM in Gujarat) that
focuses only on the lowest tiers and, in its pilot-phase,
only targets a few scattered schemes is limited by
design in its potential for vertical upscaling in the
future. Replication at a larger scale will require
considerable resources, human and otherwise.
Irrigation management transfer, or more precisely
its R&R component has short-term benefits for all
farmers in a scheme, including, if not especially, poor
farmers. However, long-term benefits of IMT for poor
farmers and the viability of handover itself are at risk
because of serious inequities in the new WUAs. Better
inclusion of the poor in information and decision-
making flows would result in more sustainable
advances in poverty alleviation. Systematic monitoring
of key variables in productivity and participation by
farm size will allow implementers to more easily spot
and correct inequities.
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The Water Policy Briefing Series translates the findings of research in water resources management into useful information for Indian policy
makers. The Series is put out by the International Water Management Institute (IWMI) in collaboration with national and state research
organizations. It is made possible by a grant from the Sir Ratan Tata Trust.
Each Briefing is supported by detailed research documentation, available on the Institute’s website (www.iwmi.org/iwmi-tata) or by direct
request (iwmi-tata@cgiar.org).
The editors of the Series welcome comments and questions. Please send correspondence to:
The Editor, Water Policy Briefing, IWMI, Elecon, Anand-Sojitra Road, Vallabh Vidyanagar 388 001, Gujarat, India
Telephone: +91-2692 229311-13 ￿ Fax: +91-2692 229310 ￿ E-mail: t.shah@cgiar.org
IWMI-Tata Water Policy Program
The IWMI-Tata Water Policy Program was launched in 2000. This is a new initiative supported by the Sir Ratan Tata Trust. The program presents
new perspectives and practical solutions derived from the wealth of research done in India on water resources management. Its objective is to
help policy makers at the central, state and local levels address their water challenges—in areas such as sustainable groundwater management,
water scarcity, and rural poverty—by translating research findings into practical policy recommendations.
Through this program, IWMI collaborates with a range of partners across India to identify, analyze and document relevant water management
approaches and current practices. These practices are assessed and synthesized for maximum policy impact in the Water Policy Briefing Series.
The Policy Program’s website (www.iwmi.org/iwmi-tata) promotes the exchange of knowledge on water resources management, within the
research community and between researchers and policy makers in India.
IWMI in India
Over the past decade, researchers from IWMI have been collaborating with Indian scientists and development organizations in the areas of
irrigation performance; satellite remote sensing; irrigation management transfer; analysis of gender, water and poverty; and malaria control.
In January 2001, a field office was established in Anand, Gujarat to work with Indian partners on groundwater management and governance. In
October 2001, IWMI established its India Regional Office in Patancheru, Hyderabad, Andhra Pradesh. IWMI’s research and cooperation in India
focus on three key areas: river basin water productivity, water and land management in watersheds, and groundwater management.
IWMI’s principal partners and collaborators for its work in India are the Indian Council of Agricultural Research (ICAR), the International Crops
Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics (ICRISAT), and a host of state irrigation departments, agricultural universities, and nongovernmental
organizations.
For further information, see www.iwmi.org/india or write to iwmi-india@cgiar.org
About IWMI
IWMI is one of the 16 Future Harvest Centers supported by the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR).
The research program of IWMI centers around five core themes:
￿ Integrated Water Resources Management for Agriculture ￿ Sustainable Groundwater Management
￿ Sustainable Smallholder Water & Land ￿ Water, Health and Environment
Management Systems ￿ Water Resources Institutions and Policy
The Institute fields a team of some 50 senior researchers with significant international experience, supported by national research staff and a
corps of some 20 postdoctoral scientists, mostly from developing countries. IWMI is headquartered in Sri Lanka with regional offices in India,
South Africa and Thailand.
All IWMI research is done with local partners (universities, government agencies, NGOs, research centers, etc.). The Institute’s outputs are public
goods that are freely available for use by all actors in water management and development. The IWMI Research Reports, data and other
publications can be downloaded from the IWMI website or received free of charge from the IWMI publications office. A series of tools for improved
water management is also available.
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